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Abstract
We discuss the endogenous selection of a costly allocation mechanism in a pure
exchange economy. The allocation mechanism is modeled as an abstract trade center
exhibitingsetupcosts,access costs and lineartransactioncosts. Exactlyonetrade center
has to be selected. We deﬁne Pareto efﬁciency in this setting and decentralize decision
making concerning consumption as well as the choice of a trade center through the
concept of a separable valuation equilibrium. In this equilibrium concept trade centers
are assigned individualizednonlinear prices.
1 Introduction
This paper generates an allocation mechanism, called a trade center, endogenously through
the consideration of the costs and beneﬁts of its performance as assessed by its users.
In contrast with the existing general equilibrium literature, trade centers are not costless,
smoothly functioning markets, but are a kind of production units determining the terms of
trade. These tradecentersthereforeinﬂuencethestandardfeasibilityand efﬁciencyconcepts,
which become relative to the speciﬁc market in function. We show that the main virtue of
a market economy, i.e., its decentralization property, can be retained in the special case of
lineartransactioncosts. Thisdecentralizationproperty,giventhepriceformationmechanism,
is obtained through the separability of individual decisions. We introduce the concept of a
separable valuation equilibrium, based on the separation of individual decisions from the
decision to determine the optimal trade center. We show that the two welfare theorems in
the standard sense apply, i.e., separable valuation equilibria are Pareto efﬁcient and Pareto
efﬁcient allocations can be supported as separable valuation equilibria.
The theory of public goods is usually constrained to public goods or commodities
as deﬁned in a euclidean space. A well known example is the Lindahl equilibrium concept
providing individual prices for a common public good. The concept of a public project,
introduced by Mas Colell (1980) and developed by Diamantaras and Gilles (1994), allows
for a more abstract interpretation of a public good. In this approach the public project is
an entity without any structure. It imposes costs which are to be shared by the users who
beneﬁt directly from this public project. The equilibrium concept in an economy with such
a public project is called a valuation equilibrium. The public project is assigned here to
be a trade center. This approach is combined with the idea expressed in Gilles and Ruys
(1994) in which an allocation mechanism is seen as a production unit, providing commodity
allocations rather than the commodities themselves. The relative performance of such units2
determine eventual acceptance as a social institution.
The output of a trade center are the terms of trade available to its traders. This output
has a public character. The inputs are divided in two types: (i) inputs used to establish the
tradecenter, calledsetupcosts, and (ii)inputsneeded by thetradersto communicatewith and
get access to a speciﬁc trade center, and the cost associated with transactions made at that
trade center, called relational costs. All these costs are related with a speciﬁc trade center,
but the second type of costs also vary across agents.
The relational costs can be internalized into the trader’s utility function or can be
treated in the trader’s budget set. This depends on the linearity of these costs. In case of
linear transaction costs, we can deﬁne trader’s cost as elements of the budget function. In
case of nonlinear transactioncost, we need toinsert these costs in the trader’s utilityfunction
and to deal with gross rather than net acquired bundles. This case is considered in Gilles,
Diamantaras and Ruys (1994). In the case of linear transaction costs the model can be
formulated in terms of net consumed bundles, i.e., bundles before subtraction of transaction
costs as acquired in the trade center. This model has a very direct economic interpretation.
Pareto efﬁciency is formulated as optimality of the net consumption bundles as generated by
the trade center, i.e., the trade center itself is not part of the Paretian ordering, but is only
indirectly taken into account through the feasibility condition.
Related work has been done by Berliant and Wang (1993), who develop a general
equilibriummodel to endogenously generatea linear city. They also introducecosts, viz. the
utility cost of travel time and the setup cost of marketplaces. These costs, however, do not
interferewith the welfare theorems. We can interpret the set of feasible trade centers as a set
of linear cities, as is done in a simple example, and arrive at an equilibrium location. The
residentiallocationofconsumersisnotaffectedinourmodel,unlessagentsarealsoallowedto
moveandchangetheutilitycostofaccessortraveltime. InWang(1990)spatialheterogeneity
of preferences and endowments was the driving force for the formation of marketplaces in
which a ﬁnite number of spatially separated consumers transact, and in which a socially
optimal marketplacegenerates acompetitiveprice. In thispaper we have restrictedourselves
to the optimal choice of one trade center, which is established only because the effects on
the gains of trade surpass the various cost involved. An economy with multiple competing
public projects having additively separable cost functions is studied by Hahn and Gilles
(1994). Berliant and Konishi (1994) recently followed up on the work of Berliant and Wang
(1993). Berliant and Konishi study a general model with geographically speciﬁc production
and fully mobile consumers, in which gains to trade combine with transportation costs and3
marketplace setup costs to generate cities endogenously. They show that equilibria exist
and that the equilibrium allocations are the same as core allocations (they have a continuum
of consumers). They also investigate the equilibrium-determined number and location of
marketplaces.
Hahn (1971) and Kurz (1974) have analysed monetary transaction costs in a general
equilibrium context. This research has given an impetus to the vast literature on incomplete
markets. Transaction costs in these intertemporal equilibrium models are commodityrelated
and may rise to inﬁnity in some markets, or may cause other types of indeterminacy. These
costs, however, do not inﬂuence institutional aspects, such as the market itself. In this sense
the work of, e.g., Lombardini (1989) and institutional economists is closer related to our
approach. But the main difference of our approach with the existing literature is that we
consider marketplaces as production units providing feasible gains of trade from speciﬁc
allocation rules rather than commodities.
2 Economies with a trade center
Asdiscussed intheintroduction,tradecentersareasubset ofacollectionofsocialinstitutions
that are designed to enable and improve upon trade of commodities at some cost. In this
section we formally introduce the various concepts.
Throughout this paper we use the symbol A to indicate the set of economic agents
as present in the economy under consideration. We assume that A is ﬁnite. Furthermore,
we suppose that there are ` 2
N private commodities available in the economy. Hence, the
commodity space is given by the nonnegative orthant of the `-dimensional Euclidean space,
R`
+. We indicate by a function w:A !
R`
+ the endowment of private goods attributed to the
agents in the economy.
In order to relate the concepts developed here with those existing in the literature, we start
with deﬁning an economy with a pure public project invoking no other individual costs than
thecontributiontoestablishthepublicproject. Thebeneﬁtsofthepublicprojectenterdirectly
the users utility function. If Γ is an unstructured set of potential public projects of which
exactly one has to be selected, then each agent a 2 A has preferences deﬁned on
R`
+  Γ,
which are represented by a utility function ¨ Ua(z;γ). The setup costs of a public project
are given by the function, c:Γ !
R`
+. An economy with a public project is a collection
E0 = hA;f¨ Uaga2A;w;(Γ;c)i,w h e r ec ( γ )
P
a 2 Aw ( a )for all γ 2 Γ.4
An allocation plan (f;γ) in
E0, consisting of an integrable distribution of private
goods f:A !
R`





a 2 Aw ( a ) .
It is obvious that the choice of a particular public project inﬂuences the privatesector
of the economy. In particular the costs c(γ) 2
R`
+ of establishing γ 2 Γ burdens the markets
for privategoods. Thus it is to be expected that the equilibrium price emerging in the market
is different for every public project selected. This is modeled through the concept of a
price correspondence. We assume rational expectations on the part of the traders regarding
the equilibrium price that results from their decisions. In order to deﬁne the appropriate















as the simplex of all normalized price vectors.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A feasible allocation (f;γ) is a valuation equilibrium in
E0 if there exist a
price system p:Γ!and a valuation function V :A  Γ !
Rsuch that
(i) the public project has a balanced budget, i.e.,
P
a2AV (a;γ)=p ( γ )c ( γ ) ,
(ii) the public project γ minimizes the deﬁcit [p()  c() −
P
a2A;V(a;)] over  2 Γ
such that for every agent a 2 AV( a;)
5 p()  w(a), for every  2 Γ, and




+Γ j p()g +V(a;)=p (  )w ( a ) g :
ThisequilibriumconceptoriginatedinMas-Colell(1980)andwasgeneralizedinDiamantaras
and Gilles (1994). The valuation function V can be interpreted as a nonlinear individual
pricing/taxation function distributing the institutional setup cost c(γ) of the trade center
among the individual agents in the economy. This is completely in line with Lindahl pricing
as used in standard public good models.1
Next we introduce an economy with a trade center exhibiting linear transaction costs. It
is assumed that agents in the economy can only trade private commodities by means of an
1For technical details of possible extensions of these results we refer to the analysis in Diamantaras and
Gilles (1994), and Diamantaras, Gilles and Scotchmer (1994).5
appropriateinstitutional frameworkthat wecall atrade center and is denotedγ 2 Γ,w h e r eΓ
is an unstructured set of potential trade centers. Each trade center affects trade opportunities
in various ways. We assume that trade centers do not enter directly into the agents’ utility
functions, i.e., there are no externalities related to the centers. However, the trade centers
create various types of costs, which we discuss below.
Although a trade center or a market is an allocation mechanism, it may be compared
with a production unit that requires private inputs and provides trades between agents as
output. In contrast to the Walrasian market, in our economy traderequires both a costly trade
center and individual effort to participate in trade. The ﬁrst type of cost is the input needed
to build and maintain the trade center, called its setup costs. We model these setup costs as
a function, c:Γ !
R`
+, called an setup cost function, assigning to each trade center γ 2 Γ
a vector of quantities of private goods c(γ) 2
R`
+ used in its construction or maintenance.
These costs are assumed to be independent of the amount of trading that takes place in the
center.
There are two types of individual effort to use the trade center, one independent of
the trading volume and the other dependent on it. To the ﬁrst type belong, e.g., the cost of
traveling to and from a trade center, of learning the language of trade and bargaining, and
learning how the center works, or where to ﬁnd the trades. Some of these costs generate
horizontal price differentiation. We call these membership or access costs.W e r e p r e s e n t
these costs by a function mγ:A !
R`
+, called the access cost function of γ 2 Γ.
The second type of individual effort consists of costs incurred by the trader related
to the actual making of transactions. Most of these costs are induced by informational
problems, i.e., these costs mostly consist of search costs for speciﬁc commodities, matching
risks, contracting expenses and contract enforcement costs. These costs, called transaction
costs, depend on the quality of a trade center, on the characteristics of a trader, and on the
amount traded. We assume that retrade between consumers is absent and that the initial
or ﬁnal endowments in traded commodities are negligible, so we can equate trade with
consumption or production. In this paper we assume that transaction costs only depend
linearly on the amount consumed. The transaction costs are thus described for each trade
center γ 2 Γ by the function γ:A ! [0;1], called the transaction cost function of γ 2 γ.
Here γ(a) 2 [0;1] is the fraction of the net consumption bundle that has to be acquired
additionally in the trade center before consumption. If agent a 2 A intends to consume
z 2
R`
+, then he has to acquire additionally γ(a)z to cover transaction costs. All together
he has to acquire the bundle (1 + γ(a))z 2
R`
+ in order to consume z.6
In this paper we do not assume that a trade center induces any other externalities
than the trade opportunities provided by the trade center. Economic agents, thus, do not take
into account directly a trade center in their utility function. Hence, for each agent a 2 A
we represent a’s preferences by a utility function Ua:
R`
+ !
R, which depends only on the
quantities of the private goods ﬁnally consumed by that agent.
In the sequel we need the following conventions. Let a 2 A. The function w : A !
R`




R monotone if for all f;g 2
R`
+: f  g implies Ua(f) >U a ( g )and strictly
monotone if for all f;g 2
R`
+: f>gimplies Ua(f) >U a ( g ) , where we use the vector
inequalities , >,a n d
=. We are now in the position to introduce economies with a trade
center.
Deﬁnition 2.2 The tuple
E := hA;w;fUaga2A;(Γ;c;m;)iis an economy with a trade






w( a) ; (1)
the cost function γ is continuous on
R`
+.
The feasibility condition (1) requires that each trade center γ 2 Γ can in fact be established
with the endowments of private goods available in the economy.
The concept of an allocation in this economy depends on the established trade center
and is derived as follows. Since we assume that a trade center has to be present in the
economy, initial resources cannot only be spent on consumption, but also have to be spent on
thetrading costs mentioned above. In this respect the initialendowment is not yet actualized,
but has to be accessed through a trade center in order to be realized.
Deﬁnition 2.3 An allocation in
E is a pair (f;γ) where f:A !
R`
+ is a distribution of







m γ( a )+c ( γ)=
X
a 2 A
w ( a ) : (2)
A feasible allocation (f;γ) is Pareto efﬁcient in
E if there is no feasible allocation (g;)
such that for all agents a 2 A: Ua(g(a))
= Ua(f(a)) and there is an agent b 2 A with
Ub(g(b)) >U b( f( b )).7
Note that we do not allow for free disposal in Deﬁnition 2.3. However, all results as derived
in the sequel can also be achieved under the assumption of free disposal.
NextweaddressthequestionofdecentralizationofParetoefﬁcientallocationsintrade
economies, using the concept of a valuation equilibrium. This concept cannot be applied on
the economy
E without suitable adaptations.
3 Separable valuation equilibria
As has been remarked, the main virtue of the linear character of transaction costs related
to a trade center is that the decision about an allocation in the economy can be separated
into determining the optimal trade center by a central authority and determining the optimal
allocation of private goods by the individual households. For that purpose we reﬁne the
concept of a valuation equilibrium as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.1 Afeasibleallocation(f;γ)in
E isaseparablevaluationequilibriumifthere
exist a price system p:Γ!and a valuation function V :A  Γ !
Rsuch that
(i) the trade center γ has a balanced budget, i.e.,
P
a2AV (a;γ)=p ( γ )c ( γ ) ,
(ii) the trade center γ minimizes the deﬁcit [p()  c() −
P
a2AV (a;)]over  2 Γ,
such that for all agents a 2 A, V (a;)
5 p() [w(a) − m(a)] and
(iii) for every agent a 2 A, the ﬁnal consumption bundle f(a) maximizes the utility
function Ua on the intersection of the budget sets \2ΓB(a),w h e r e
B ( a )=f g2
R`
+jp (  )[(1 + (a))g + m(a)] + V (a;)  p() w(a)g:
Themain result ofthismodel ofatradeeconomywith linearmarkettransactioncosts isgiven
by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 Let
E be an economy with a trade center inducing linear transaction costs,
such that for all agents a 2 A the utility function Ua is monotone. Then the following
statements hold:
(a) Each separable valuation equilibrium in
E is Pareto efﬁcient.8
(b) Ifforeveryagenta 2 AtheutilityfunctionUa iscontinuous,quasi-concaveandstrict-
ly monotone, then each Pareto efﬁcient allocation can be supported as a separable
valuation equilibrium.
Proof of part (a)
Let (f;γ) be a separable valuation equilibrium with an equilibrium price system p and
valuation function V . We must show that (f;γ)is Pareto efﬁcient.
Suppose to the contrary that (f;γ) is not Pareto efﬁcient. Then there exists a feasible
allocation (g;) meeting condition 2 with for all a in A
Ua(g(a))
= Ua(f(a));
and for at least one b 2 A
Ub(g(b)) >U b( f( b )):






m ( a )+c ( )=w: (3)
Condition (iii) of the deﬁnition of a separable valuation equilibrium and the monotonicityof
theutilityfunctionsimplythatforallainAwehavethat(1+(a))p()g(a)+p()m(a)+
V(a;)
= p()w(a)and foragent b we have (1+(b))p()g(b)+p()t(b)+V(b;) >














0;)>p (  )w: (4)















0) − (1 + (a
0))g(a








a02AV (a0;)−p()c()> by (4)
>p (  )
P
a 02 A( w ( a 0)−m ( a 0)
− (1 + (a0))g(a0)) − p()  c()= by (6)
= p()  0=0 :9
This is a contradiction proving part (a) of the assertion.
Proof of part (b)
Let (f;γ) be a Pareto efﬁcient allocation in













+ j U a ( g )
= U a ( f ( a ))
o
:
Note that F(a) 6= ; by strict monotonicity of Ua. Moreover, it follows that F(a) is open
relative, convex, and bounded from below. F(a) is the closure of F(a),b yt h es t r i c t
monotonicity and continuity of Ua, and, except for being a closed set, F(a) inherits all the
properties of F(a) listed. Let
F(): =
X




m ( a 0)+c ( )−w; and
F(): =
X








F() is nonempty, open relative, convex, bounded from below, and contains only feasible
allocations. F()has thesame propertiesexcept that it isclosed. Sincemonotonicityimplies
that the recession cones (Rockafellar (1970), page 61) of the F(a0) sets are all contained in
R`
+, Corollary 9.1.1 of Rockafellar (1970, page 74) applies, hence F() is also the closure of
F(),c l F( ) .
Because (f;γ) is efﬁcient, we have 0 = 2 F(). By the strict monotonicity of preferences,
there exists >0such that e 2 F(),w h e r ee:= (1;1;:::;1) 2
R`. Hence there exists

= 0 (possibly 0) such that e is at the boundary of F(), i.e.,
e 2 F() n F():











But since e = 2 F() and F() is a convex and open set, there exists a vector p() 2
R`nf0g
such that p()  v>p (  ) e for all v 2 F(). (By the standard supporting hyperplane10
theorem, e.g., Rockafellar (1970), Theorem 11.6, page 100, applied to F() and by the fact
that F() is the interior of F().)
Monotonicity of the preferences, again, implies that prices are nonnegative, so we can now
scale the vector p() without loss of generality to achieve p() 2 . In this way we have
deﬁned a function p:Γ!Int. We now show that p satisﬁes the conditions as required in
Deﬁnition 3.1.
Let the vector x(a;) 2
R`
+ be chosen such that, in case  6= γ,




and in case  = γ, x(a;)=x ( a;γ)=f ( a ) . Clearly, such vectors exist, because of strict
monotonicity, F(a) 
R`
+,a n dp (  )>0and are feasible. Finally, we deﬁne a valuation
function V :A  Γ !
Rby
V (a;): =p (  )w ( a )−p (  )m ( a )−(1 + (a))p()  x(a;):
Note that V (a;) is ﬁnite and V (a;)
5 p()  w(a) − p() m(a) by deﬁnition.
We now check the three requirements of Deﬁnition 3.1.
CONDITION (I)




0;γ)=p ( γ )  w − p ( γ ) 
X
a 0 2 A
t γ ( a
0 ) − p ( γ ) 
X




= p(γ)  c(γ):
CONDITION (II)
By construction, p()  inf F()










0)+p ( )c ( )
= p ( )w:





0;)=p (  )  w − p (  ) 
X
a 0 2 A
m  ( a
0 ) − p (  ) 
X





Thus, together with (i) as shown above we conclude that condition (ii) of Deﬁnition 3.1 is
satisﬁed for the price system p.
CONDITION (III)
Let a 2 A. Now, by the continuity and strict monotonicity of preferences, it follows that
Ua(x(a;)) = Ua(f(a)).
First note that if  = γ, then
(1 + )p()  f(a)+V( a;)=p ( )w ( a )−p ( )m ( a ) :
For any g 2
R`
+ with Ua(g) >U a( f( a )) = Ua(x(a;)),w eh a v e
(1 + (a))p()  g + V (a;)=
(1 + (a))p()  g + p()  [w(a)− m(a)] − (1 + (a))p()  x(a;)
=
p()  w(a)− p()  m(a); (7)
since p()  g
= p()  x(a;) by the deﬁnition of x(a;).
Let  2 Γ and deﬁne the budget set of agent a in trade center  by
B(a): =f g2
R`
+jp (  )[(1 + (a))g + m(a)]
5 p()  w(a) − V (a;)g:
Since V (a;)
5 p()w(a)−p()m(a) we conclude that 0 2 B(a). Furthermore,by (1)




p ( )m ( a)<p (  )w:
Then there is at least one agent b 2 A such that
V (b;) <p (  )w ( b )−p (  )m ( b ) (8)
This implies that B(b) has a non-empty interior. For every b 2 A satisfying (8) it evidently
holds that x(b;) 2 B(b).
First, we note that x(b;) is on the boundary of B(b). Indeed if g is in the interior of B(b),
then equation (7) implies that Ub(g)
5 Ub(f(b)) = Ub(x(b;)).
Second, we claim that x(b;) is a maximal element in B(b). Suppose not. Then there is
a g 2 B(b) such that Ub(g) >U b ( x ( b;)). By continuity of Ub there is a neighborhood
around g such that all bundles in that neighborhood are better thanx(b;).S i n c eB ( b )has a
non-empty interior, this implies that there is a bundle h 2 intB(b) with Ub(h) >U b( f ( b )).
But this contradicts (7).12
This contradiction leads to the conclusion that x(b;)is indeed a maximal element in B(b).
But then strict monotonicity of Ub excludes the possibility that certain prices are zero, i.e.,
p()  0. (Otherwise the existence of a maximal element would be contradicted.)
Since p()  0, it is obvious that for any agent a 2 A we have that Ba() is compact and
convex, and Ua(f(a))
= Ua(g) for any g 2 B(a).
Finally, evidently f(a) 2 Bγ(a) for every a 2 A. Together with the above and Ua(f(a)) =
Ua(x(a;))forevery 2 Γ weconcludethat for every agenta 2 A thebundlef(a)is indeed
maximal in \2ΓB(a).
This shows condition (iii).
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.2.
2
To illustrate the welfare properties related to the choice of a trade center in an economy we
discuss the simplest possible spatial model with two agents in which trader’scosts aresimply
ﬁxedtransportationcosts. Thenextexampleshowsthatinthesesimplecases thepricesystem
can even be replaced by a uniquely determined price vector, i.e., prices areirrespective of the
location of the trade center.
Example 3.3 Access costs only
We consider a situation in which the basic data is given by ` =2 ,A=f a;bg, w(a)=( 2 ;0),
w(b)=( 0 ;2) and ﬁnally Ua(x1;x 2)=x 2and Ub(x1;x 2)=x 1for all x =( x 1;x 2)2
R2
+.
(We remark that these preferences are only monotone, and not strictly monotone as required
in Theorem 3.2 (b).)
Weconsideraspatial modelof thelocationof atradecenter. Both agents(aandb)arelocated
at the extreme positions of some interval, identiﬁed with the unit interval [0;1]. It is clear
that in the absence of maintenance costs only trade centers positioned on this interval, i.e., in
between the two agents, are potentially Pareto efﬁcient.
For every k 2 [0;1] we deﬁne mk:A !
R2
+ by mk(a)=( k;k) and mk(b)=( 1−k;1−k).
The function mk obviously is an access cost function. We limit ourselves to trade centers
which exhibit access costs only, i.e., there are no variable transaction costs and we assume
the absence of setup cost. Under these assumptions we may deﬁne Γ: =[ 0 ; 1] as the
collection of trade centers. We assume that there are no losses depending on the transaction
or consumption volume, such as costs due to contracting. For any k 2 [0;1] we have that
mk(a)+mk(b)=( 1 ;1),i.e., theaggregatelossduetoaccesscostsinthiseconomyisconstant
irrespective of the location of the trade center, wherek 2 [0;1] represents this location.13
This deﬁnes the economy
E1. It is obvious that the set of Pareto efﬁcient allocations is given
by
f(f;k) j f(a)=( 0 ;1);f ( b )=( 1 ;0);k 2 [0;1]g:
We now claim that for any k 2 [0;1] the Pareto efﬁcient allocation (f;k) can be supported
as a valuation equilibrium with the following system of prices and valuations:




3 ) 2  and V :A [0;1] !
Rgiven by V (a;k0): =k 0−kand V (b;k0): =
k−k 0.N o w ( f;k) is a valuation equilibrium with respect to the price system given by
p(k0): =b p ,k 02[0;1], and the valuation function V . Note that the price system is constant,
as the aggregate losses due to access costs in this economy do not depend on the location of
the trade center.
2
The following consequence of Theorem 3.2 states some conditions under which Pareto
efﬁcient allocations can be supported by constant pricesystems. Indeed these are exactly the
conditions of the trade economy as discussed in Example 3.3.
Corollary 3.4 Let
E beaneconomywithatradecenterwithaccesscostsandsetupcostsonly,
i.e., foreverytradecenterγ 2 Γ: γ(a)=0 ,a2A ,suchthatforeveryagenta 2 Atheutility




a 2 Am ( a )+c ( )for all γ; 2 Γ, then every Pareto efﬁcient allocation can be supported
as a separable valuation equilibrium with a constant price system, i.e., the price vector for
private goods is the same for all possible trade centers.
PROOF
The proof of this corollary is a direct adaptation of the proof of Theorem 3.2 (b), noting that
if the conditionsof thecorollaryaresatisﬁed, F(γ)=F(  )for allγ; 2 Γ. Hence, theprice
constructed in that proof is determined uniquely, irrespective of the trade center γ 2 Γ.
2
In general it is not possible to decentralize a Pareto efﬁcient allocation relative to a trade
center with the same price for all trade centers if there are non-trivial transaction costs. The
next example, which enhances Example 3.3, shows this in a clear fashion.
Example 3.5 Access costs and linear transaction costs
Consider a trade situation with the same basic information as given in Example 3.3, i.e.,
` =2 ,A=f a;bg, w(a)=( 2 ; 0), w(b)=( 0 ; 2), Ua(x1;x 2)=x 2 ,a n dU b( x 1;x 2)=x 1 .
We now assume that there are no access costs, but there are linear transaction costs. For14
that purpose we introduce for every k 2 (0;1) a trade center by the function k:A ! [0;1)
deﬁned by k(a)= k
1 − k and k(b)=1 − k
k . 2 The function k describes the market transaction
costs. Given that we limit ourselves to the case of market transaction costs only, Γ: =( 0 ;1)
is the collection of all potential trade centers in this economy. Finally, there are no setup
costs with respect to these trade centers, i.e., c =0 . This completes the description of the
ﬁnite trade economy
E2.
We claim that the set of Pareto efﬁcient allocations in
E2 is given by
f(fk;k)jf k(a)=( 0 ;2−2 k ) ;f k ( b )=( 2 k;0);k2(0;1)g:
Each Pareto efﬁcient allocation can be supported as a valuation equilibrium as deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 3.1. Take k 2 (0;1) and the corresponding Pareto efﬁcient allocation (fk;k).
We introduce the price system p:(0;1) !  by p(k0): =( k 0;1−k 0)for every k0 2 (0;1).




0): =2 ( k+k
0)−2 and Vk(b;k
0): =2−2(k + k
0); where k
0 2 (0;1):
Note that even at the equilibrium location of the trade center given by k0 = k there are
transfers from one agent to the other to compensate for the inequalities of the transaction
costs. These compensations are given by Vk(a;k)=4 k−2and Vk(b;k)=2−4 k .
2
2This implies that the fractional loss due to market transaction costs for agent a amounts to k and for agent
b is equal to 1 − k.15
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